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This paper is concerned with some corporate governance issues related to newly listed 
firms in China based on a sample of  329 firms commencing listing on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock exchange (SZSE) during the period 
from 1998 to 2000. We first investigate the impact of ownership change due to stock 
market listing on corporate performance. We consider four aspects of corporate 
performance: profitability, sales, leverage and employee productivity. Our research 
results indicate that, on average, profitability, sales and employee productivity have 
improved from pre-listing to post-listing. We further investigate the impacts of state 
majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effects on corporate performance. 
Overall, this paper provides some new evidence on the listing effect, ownership 
structure and regulation effect on Chinese firms which will be valuable to the future 
reform of state owned enterprises in China.  
Key Words:- State owned enterprise, corporate governance, and corporate 
performance. 
  11.   Introduction 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that assure suppliers of 
finance get a return on their investment. Bai et al (2002) classify the mechanisms into 
two types: internal mechanisms which include factors such as the board of directors, 
executive compensations, ownership structure, financial transparency and adequate 
information disclosure, and externals mechanisms which include the market for 
caproate control, legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, product 
market competition.  
The concept of corporate governance has developed over the past several decades 
primarily in developed market economies. However, the recent experiences of 
corporate scandals such as the Enron, Worldcom in the US, Parmalat in Italy and HIH 
in Australia have cast much doubt on the existing corporate governance system and 
mechanism in the Western countries. These scandals have helped to raise the public 
awareness of corporate governance and called for higher governance standards in the 
West. Corporate governance development is now recognised as essential to the 
successful transition to an efficient market system (Lin, 2001).  
Corporate governance has also gained unparallel importance in China since market 
reforms began in 1978 (Bai et al, 2002). The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen Stock exchange (SZSE) have been established in the 1990s and now 
China’s stock markets have become the eighth largest in the world with market 
capitalisation of over US$500 billion. One important aspect of improving corporate 
governance in China is the privatisation. Many state owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
been successfully listed on the Chinese stock markets.  
  2This paper aims to investigate some issues related to the corporate governance by 
using data on 329 newly listed firms in SHSE and SZSE. Ownership change is one 
important internal corporate governance mechanism. We first examine the impact of 
ownership change due to stock market listing. We then address the impact of state 
majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effects on corporate performance 
around the listing period. The state control and foreign ownership factors are part of 
the internal mechanisms of corporate governance. In contrast, the regulation factor is 
one of the external mechanisms of corporate governance. Obviously, there are many 
corporate governance factors which can be considered. However, due to the data 
availability, we only consider these three factors: state majority control, foreign 
ownership and regulation. We shall investigate the impacts of these factors on 
performance in three cases: pre-listing, post-listing and pooled data. 
There are a few existing studies on the performance changes due to privatizations. 
These include Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001), D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and D’Souza et al (2001). More 
recently, Sun and Tong (2003) evaluate the performance of 634 state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) listed on China’s two exchanges upon privatisation in the period 
1994-1998. We follow the methodology employed in these studies to consider the 
listing effect on corporate performance. However, the firms in our data commenced 
listing between 1998 and 2000. Thus our data are more recent compared to Sun and 
Tong (2003). We shall compare our results on the listing effect with Sun and Tong 
(2003).  
A few papers on corporate governance in China exist in the literature. Xu and Wang 
(1999) investigate whether ownership structure has significant effects on the 
performance of publicly listed companies in China and in what way it does. It is found 
  3that ownership structure indeed has significant effects on the performance of stock 
companies in China. Chen (2001) examines the cross-sectional relation between 
ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of 434 manufacturing 
firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Qi et al (2001) investigate whether and 
how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms is affected by their 
shareholding structure by using a sample of firms listed on SHSE from 1991 to 1996. 
Our study is different from these studies as we focus on the newly listed firms and we 
investigate the possible changes in the corporate governance mechanism due to stock 
market listing.  
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data 
and the methodology for the study. Section 3 presents the empirical results. In Section 
4, we summarise the key findings of this study. 
2.   Data and Methodology 
In this paper, we seek to determine whether the stock exchange listing of Chinese 
firms is truly desirable and lives up to the expectations of the governments and 
development agencies for the performance of the newly listed firms. We are also 
concerned with the impacts of some corporate governance variables, namely, state 
majority control, foreign ownership and regulation. To this end, we employ two types 
of techniques: empirical study of the changes in performance due to listing and the 
regression analysis of the relationship between performance and the underlying 




  42.1. Data 
We follow the existing studies, in particular Sun and Tong (2003) and compare 
performance changes three years before and three years after listing. Similarly, we 
define the year of listing as Year 0. The three years before listing are labelled Year -1, 
-2, and -3 respectively. Likewise, the three years after the listing are labelled as Year 
1, 2, 3, respectively.  
Note that a new set of accounting standards in China was introduced in 1993. The 
new accounting standards which are closer to international norms took effect in 
January 1994.Thus only all financial statements after 1993 are comparable. Taking 
this factor into account, we select firms commencing listing from 1998 to 2000 for the 
purpose of this paper. Hence all data used in this paper are between 1995 and 2003. It 
should be noted that our data which do not overlap with Sun and Tong (2003) are 
more recent. There were altogether 339 firms’ commenced listings in China during 
the sample period. After excluding some firms for which complete data are not 
available, we obtain a sample of 329 firms. All data are obtained from the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) prepared by the China 
Accounting and Finance Research Centre of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
and the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company.  
2.2   Selection of performance variables 
Before we further discuss our methodology, we need to select the performance 
measures for our study. We consider four aspects of the corporate performance: 
profitability, output, sales and employee productivity. Our choices are largely 
dependent on the availability of data. 
 
  5•  Profitability 
The firms considered in this paper all went through primary offerings instead of 
secondary offerings. In a primary offering, the government sells existing equities and 
receives all of the sales proceeds and the only effect on the firm comes from 
ownership change. Associated with the initial listing in Chinese stock markets, a firm 
normally increases its asset and equity accounts by an equal amount. Besides, after 
the initial listings, firms are allowed to have a right issue up to 30% of outstanding 
stocks annually (Yu and Ying, 20001).  Many firms issue new shares after the initial 
listing even there were no good investment opportunities. Therefore, it is common 
that a firm’s capital and equity capital change dramatically in the years after the initial 
listing. Given this special situation, it is hard to use the return on asset (ROA) and 
return on Equity (ROE) to measure the profitability of a firm after its listing. Instead 
of using ROA and ROE, this paper, as in Sun and Tong (2003), employs two other 
measures for the profitability: real net profit (RNP) and net profit margins or return on 
sales (ROS). 
In this paper, RNP figures are first adjusted for inflation
1, then normalised relative to 
the listing year where the listing year RNP is set to 1. This normalization can avoid 
the side effect due to the issues of new shares.  
•  Output  
In this paper, we use the real sales (RS) figure to measure the output for each firm. 
The real sales are based on the accounting sales figures and adjusted for inflation 
similarly as for RNP. The real sales are also normalized to 1 for the year of listing 
(Year 0). 
                                                 
1The listing year figures are taken as the base, the figures for pre and post listing years are then 
adjusted for inflation accordingly.  
  6•  Leverage 
We use the ratio of total liability to total asset as a measure for financial leverage. 
Although the validity of this measure may suffer from the dramatic capital changes 
due to listing
2, we do not have a better choice due to the lack of information on 
interest expense and cash flows before listing, we can not use other measures such as 
time interest earned and cash ratio etc.  
•  Employee efficiency 
Improving the employee productivity and efficiency has been an aim for SOE reform 
in China. We are interested in how our sample SOEs behaved after listing in terms of 
employment levels and employee efficiency. To this end, we use three measures: the 
number of employees, the real sales per employee, and the real net profit per 
employee. Given that very few firms reveal their number of employees before the 
listing, we compare the post-listing employee figures with the listing year figures 
rather than the pre-listing figures.  
2.3.   The listing effect on performance 
In this paper we mainly use the median of each performance variable to analyse the 
change in performance due to stock market listing. In the mean time, we also use the 
mean value of each variable as a reference.  
To be more specific, we use the Wilcoxon signed rank test as our principal method of 
testing for significant changes in the performance variables. Note that we assume that 
the samples are independent. The Wilcoxon Z-test statistics are normal when both 
sample sizes are bigger than 25. This condition is easily satisfied given our total 
number of firms considered.  
                                                 
2 We note that this is the same problem plagues the use of ROA and ROE as performance measures. 
  7In addition to the Wilcoxon signed rank test, we also use a proportion test to 
determine whether the proportion ( ) of firms experiencing changes in a given 
direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing 
whether ). Given the large number of firms considered, finding that an 
overwhelming proportion of firms changed performance in the same direction may be 
at least as informative as a finding concerning the median change in performance. 
p
5 . 0 = p
2.4.  State majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effect 
We consider two indicators of ownership structures in this paper: state ownership and 
foreign ownership. If the state ownership of a firm at listing is more than 50%, it is 
classified as state majority control (SML). Otherwise, it is classified as non-state 
majority control, which means virtually dispersed ownership in most cases. In 
addition, we also consider the foreign ownership factor to investigate if there are any 
impacts on a firm’s performance due to the existence of foreign ownership in Year 0.  
For the regulation factor, we classify firms in the energy, public utilities, finance and 
telecommunication industries as regulated and all other firms are regarded as non-
regulated. 
We use a multi-linear regression approach to investigate the ownership structure and 
regulation effect on newly listed firms on the Chinese stock markets. We shall 
consider three cases: pre-listing, post-listing and the pooled data
3. The purpose is to 
observe the effects of these factors on corporate performance as well as any their 
changes from pre-listing to post-listing. 
Specifically, we use the cross-sectional data to run three groups of regressions to see 
the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure as well as 
                                                 
3 Note that the pooled data include the pre-listing and post-listing data. However, the data of the listing 
year are not included in the pooled data. 
  8regulation: one regression with the prelisting data (Year -3 to Year -1) to see the pre-
listing effect, one regression with the post-listing data (Year 1 to Year 3) to see the 
post-listing effect, one with the pooled data (year -3 to Year -1 and Year 1 to Year 3) 
to see the overall effect.  
The regression model is as follows: 
i i i i i REG FRN SMC PP ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0  
where  
PP  is one of the performance variables, i.e.,   Moreover, 
, are dummy variable defined as follows. 
. , , , LA RS ROS RNP
SMC FRN REV REG , ,
If the state ownership of a firm exceeds 50% at listing,  is set to 1, otherwise 0; 
If a firm has B-, N-, or H- shares
SMC
4 at the time of listing  is set to 1, otherwise 0; 
If a firm is in a regulated industry,  is set to 1, otherwise 0. 
FRN
REG
We note that the R squared measures of these regressions are expected to be very low 
as there are much more important variables such as GDP or interested rates which 
have more explanation powers on the performance measures than these dummy 
variables. However, these regressions are sufficient and useful in serving the purpose 
of this paper which is to observe the significance of the variables  
. For the sake of simplicity, we do not use control variables as in Sun and Tong 
(2003), for these regressions. 
. , , FRN REV REG
SMC
Finally, it should be observed that we do not use the data for the listing year (Year 0) 
so that we can avoid the initial public offering (IPO) effect 
5 as widely documented in 
the literature. 
                                                 
4Shares in China are classified as domestic (A-shares) and foreign (B-, H- N- shares) by holder’s 
residency. For further details, see e.g. Xu and Wang (1999).  
  93    Empirical results 
3.1. The stock market listing effect 
In this subsection we consider the listing effect on performance based on the whole 
sample of 329 firms. The results are reported in Table 1. 
First, let us analyse the profitability changes due to stock market listing. The mean 
(median) of the three year average real net profit has increased from 0.90 (0.74) of 
pre-listing to 0.99 (0.97) of post-listing. The Wilcoxon statistic is 6.3. Thus the 
change in RNP due to listing has been significant at the 1% level. Among the 329 
firms considered, the RNP of 214 firms increased while 115 firms decreased. The 
binomial test also indicates significance at 1% level. Thus we can conclude that, on 
average, the RNP has increased from pre-listing to post listing. It should be noted that 
both RNP average and median are less than 1, i.e. less than the corresponding figures 
in Year 0. This may be due to the IPO effect and it is the reason that we exclude the 
Year 0 data from our analysis in this paper.  
Similar trends hold for   measure. The mean (median) of return on sales 
increased from 0.18 (0.12) of pre-listing to 0.19 (0.13) of post listing. Both Wilcoxon 
and proportion Z-statistics indicate significant changes. Thus listing appears to have 
enhanced the return on sales.  
ROS
The average (median) of RS increases from 0.84 (0.80) of pre-listing to 1.45 (1.37) of 
post-listing. Both average and median have increased significantly from pre-listing to 
post-listing. 
                                                                                                                                            
5It is widely documented that IPO firms outperform the market after the listing (see e.g. Ritter and 
Welch, 2004). Also, there are normally dramatic changes in the assets and equity accounts due to 
listing. Hence the performance in Year 0 is rather abnormal. Thus we exclude the data of Year 0. 
  10Compared to prelisting, The LA  ratio decrease after listing. The before listing LA  
ratios have an average of 0.56 which decreases to 0.40. In the mean time, the median 
decreases from 0.60 to 0.40. Among the 327 companies considered, only 36 firms 
have shown an increase in the leverage ratio. The rest 291 companies all have shown 
a decrease in leverage. This may be due to the following reasons. Before listing, SOEs 
can borrow easily at a favourite rate due to the state guarantee. After the listing, the 
borrowing opportunity costs go up and the firm may also have more channels to 
obtain funds. Consequently, the leverage ratio decreases from pre-listing to post-
listing.  
Compared to the pre-listing years, we see the employment level has little increase 
after listing as shown by the average and median of employment. This observation 
may be explained by the expansion of businesses after the listing which can be likely 
due to the economic booming for the past two decades. However, the Wilcoxon 
statistic shows that changes are insignificant. The Wilcoxon Z -test statistic reveal that 
real sales per employee after listing have increased significantly from the listing year. 
In contract, the real net profit per employee has declined significantly from the listing 
year.  
In summary, it is difficult for us to conclude the direction of employee efficiency 
changes after listing.
  11Table 1  Summary of Results for the sample of all newly listed firms 
This table presents the empirical results for the whole sample of newly listed firms. For each performance measure, it provides the mean and 
median values for the three-year period before and after listing, the number of observations, and the change in mean and median values. It also 
provides  T statistic of Wilcoxon signed ranks test for the difference in medians, the proportion of firms that performed as predicted, and Z 
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athese figures are from the listing year figures due to the unavailability of pre-listing data. *** represents significant at 1%.
  12 3.2. State majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effect  
In this subsection, we use the multi-linear regression model to investigate if the state 
majority control (SMC), foreign ownership and regulation are significant in 
explaining performance variables. We consider three cases: pre-listing, post-listing 
and pooled data.  
•  Prelisting period 
Table 2 reveals that   has negative coefficients for the regressions with 
 and   though only the coefficient for RNP is statistically significant. 
This suggests that state majority control hurts corporate performance and it should be 
reduced.  A similar but a stronger conclusion is obtained by Sun and Tong (2003). 
The positive coefficient of   in the
SMC
, RNP ROS , RS
SMC LA  regression implies that the relationship 
between state majority control and leverage is positive and weak. 
The coefficients of   are negative for all the four regressions. However, only the 
coefficient in   is statistically significant. This could be due to the following reason 
as suggested by Sun and Tong (2003). The firms that issue foreign shares typically 
have a large proportion of the total ownership of the firm in the form of state 
ownership.   appears to be negatively related to performance. Further, the 





Regulation effect is only significant to leverage ratio. This means firms in the 
regulated industries tend to have lower leverage relative to their total assets. The 
relationship between regulation and real net profit ( ) is negative, while the 
relationships between regulation and  as well as are both negative. Thus it 
appears that the results regarding performance and regulation are mixed and no clear 
cut conclusion can be drawn.  
RNP
ROS RS
  13Table 2  Regression results: Pre-listing 
This table presents the regression analysis on the pre-listing sample of listed firms 
based on the following model:  i i i i i REG FRN SMC PP ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0  




significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
 
 RNP  ROS  RS  LA 
0.987
  0.277






-0.199 -0.107 -0.029 0.006  SMC 
(-1.685)
 * (-0.746) (-1.107) (0.613) 
-0.166 -0.047 -0.113 -0.016  FRN 
(-0.688) (-0.161)  (-2.109)
 ** (-0.847) 
-0.011 0.058 0.043 -0.038  REG 




0.003 0.001 0.006 0.008 
DW  1.993 2.009 1.908 2.305 
OBS  987 986 987 985 
 
•  Post listing period 
Table 3 presents the results for the post listing regressions.   has negative 
coefficients for the regressions with   and  and positive coefficients 
for  None of the SMC  coefficients are statistically significant. This suggests 
that negative impact of state majority control on firm performance has reduced from 
pre-listing to post-listing. 
SMC
, RNP , RS
. ROS
FRN have negative coefficients for the regressions of RNP and LA, positive 
coefficients with ROS and RS. Only the FRN coefficient in the LA regression is 
statistically significant, indicating that firms with foreign ownership tend to have 
lower leverage post listing. The regression results also show that the relationship 
  14between FRN and performance has moved somehow to the positive direction from the 
uniform negative direction of prelisting period.  
The coefficients of REG are significant in both ROS and LA regressions. This means 
firms in the regulated industries tend have lower leverage relative to their total assets 
and higher ROS relative to non regulated firms. 
Table 3  Regression results: Post-listing 
This table presents the regression analysis on the post-listing sample of listed firms 
based on the following model:  i i i i i REG FRN SMC PP ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0  




significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
 
 RNP  ROS  RS  LA 






-0.094 0.021  -0.03  0.003  SMC 
(-0.576) (1.253) (-0.541) (0.321) 
-0.029 0.040 0.046 -0.037  FRN 
(-0.088) (1.176) (0.405)  (-1.768)
 *
0.119 0.175 -1.35 -0.068  REG 
(0.454) (6.556)




0.001 0.044 0.003 0.021 
DW  1.964 1.794 1.573 2.019 
OBS  987 987 987 987 
 
•  Pooled data 
Table 4 presents the results for the regressions with pooled data. 
SMC has negative coefficients for the regressions with RNP, ROS and RS, and 
positive coefficients for LA. None of the SMC coefficients are statistically significant. 
This suggests that SMC has an overall limited but negative impact on performance. 
  15FRN has negative coefficients for all the r regressions. Only the FRN coefficient in the 
LA regression is statistically significant. This implies that FRN has overall negative 
impacts on performance and strong negative impact on leverage ratio. 
Regulation effect is only significant to the leverage ratio. This means regulated firms 
tend to have lower leverage relative to their total assets. The impact of regulation on 
performance is somewhat mixed, with negative impact on RS and positive impact on 
RNP and ROS.  
 
Table 4  Regression results: pooled data 
This table presents the regression analysis on the full sample of listed firms based on 
the following model:  i i i i i REG FRN SMC PP ε β β β β + + + + = 3 2 1 0  
where PP is the performance proxy. We use the pooled data of Year -3 to -1 and Year 
1 to year 3. The t-statistics are in brackets, 
*,
**and 
*** denote significant at 10%, 5%, 
1%, respectively.
 
 RNP  ROS  RS  LA 






-0.147 -0.045 -0.029 0.004  SMC 
(-1.457) (-0.621) (-0.869) (0.538) 
-0.098 -0.005 -0.034 -0.026  FRN 
(-0.476) (-0.037) (-0.488)  (-1.641)
 *
0.055 0.115 -0.044  -0.054  REG 




0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 
DW  1.974 2.001 1.356 1.550 
OBS  1974 1961 1974 1972 
 
In summary, our results show that there are some slight changes in the corporate 
governance mechanisms due to the listing event. In all three cases, it appears that 
regulation has a significant impact on firm leverage ratio. Foreign ownership is 
negatively related to the leverage ratio. SMC has a negative impact on performance 
  16before listing and the negative impact alleviates after listing. Regulation has a strong 
negative relationship with leverage. 
 
4.  Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we use the data on newly listed firms on the Chinese stock markets 
during the period from 1998 and 2000 to investigate the impact of the stock market 
listing and some corporate governance factors on corporate performance. The 
corporate governance factors considered in the paper are: the state majority control 
factor, foreign ownership factor, as well as regulation factor.  
Compared to Sun and Tong (2003), our study uses more recent data. Our results 
support that the listing event has significant impact on corporate performance. We 
find strong evidence for the improvement in real net profit and return on sales, real 
sales, as well as employee efficiency after listing. These are similar to previous 
conclusions in the literature. However, we also see some evidence of decrease in 
leverage after listing. In short, our empirical research provides significant supporting 
evidence for the stock market listing of Chinese firms which is part of the SOE 
reforms in China in the past two decades. 
We also investigate the impacts of the state majority control factor, the foreign 
ownership factor and regulation factor on corporate performance. We see some weak 
evidence that the corporate governance mechanisms have changed slightly from pre-
listing to post-listing. In contrast to the evidence obtained in Sun and Tong (2003), the 
state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation hardly show significant 
impact on the performance. However, our results do support that the regulation factor 
has significant impact on leverage all the time.  
  17Overall, our results shed some light on the further reform of SOEs in China. Our 
results suggest that the stock market listing in China has been successful in terms of 
corporate performance. Thus the direction of SOE reform was correct and should be 
maintained for the future. Overall, the state majority control, foreign ownership and 
regulation factors have very limited impact on corporate performance. This suggests 
that these factors should not be a big concern for the further SOE reforms as far as 
corporate performance is considered. The sate majority control variable is overall 
negatively related to the performance measures used in this paper, thus it would be a 
good thing for corporate performance if the state majority control can be reduced at 
listing. This point is also supported by Sun and Tong (2003).  
Finally, we note that one should be cautious with the interpretation of the findings in 
this paper. The results should be understood in a suggestive rather than decisive way 
as with most studies on corporate governance.  
 
References 
Bai C.N., Liu, Q., Song, F.M. and Zhan J., Corporate Governance and firm valuations 
in China, Working paper, University of Hong Kong. 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.,1998. The financial and operating performance of newly 
privatized firms: evidence from developing countries. Journal of Finance 53, 1081-
1110. 
Chen, J., 2001. Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism: evidence 
from Chinese listed companies, Economics of Planning, 34, 53-72. 
D’Souza, J., Megginson, W.L., 1999. The financial and operating performance of 
newly privatized firms in the 1990s. Journal of Finance 54, 1397-1438. 
  18Lin, C., 2001, Corporatisation and corporate governance in China’s economic 
transition. Economics of Planning, 34, 5-35. 
Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C., Netter, J.M., Schwartz, A.L., 2000. The long-run 
return to investors in share issue privatization. Financial Management 29, 67-77. 
Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C., Randenborgh, M.V., 1994. The financial and operating 
performance of newly privatized firms: an international empirical analysis. Journal of 
Finance 49, 403-452. 
Qi, D., Wu, W. and Zhang, H., 2000, Shareholding structure and corporate 
performance of partially privatized firms: evidence from listed Chinese companies. 
Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 8, 587-610. 
Ritter, Jay R. & Welch, Ivo, 2002. A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations. 
The Journal of Finance 57 (4), 1795-1828.
Shleiferr,A. and Vishny, R., 1997. A survey of corporate governance, Journal of 
Finance, 52, 737-783. 
Sun, Q., and Tong, W.H.S., 2003. China share issue privatization: the extent of its 
success. Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 183-222. 
Xu, X. and Wang, Y., 1999. Ownership Structure and corporate governance in 
Chinese stock companies. China Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 75-98. 
Yu, Q., and Ying, C., 2001. Market reactions to dividend announcements in emerging 
market: new evidence from China. Unpublished working paper, Fudan University and 
National University of Singapore.  
  19 
LISTING OF DISCUSSION PAPERS - 2003  
 
Valadkhani A, & Layton A, Quantifying the Effect of GST on Inflation in 
Australia’s Capital Cities: An Intervention Analysis, No 153, September 
2003 
 
Worthington A, & Valadkhani A, Measuring the Impact of Natural 
Disasters on Capital Markets:  An Empirical Application Using 
Intervention Analysis, No 154, September 2003 
 
Robinson M, The Output Concept and Public Sector Services, No 155, 
September 2003 
 
Worthington A, Brown K, Crawford M, & Pickernell D, Socio-Economic 
and Demographic Determinants of Household Gambling in Australia, No 
156, September 2003 
 
Worthington A, & Higgs H, Tests of Random Walks and Market 
Efficiency in Latin American Stock Markets: An Empirical Note, No 157, 
September 2003 
 
(Replacing Previous No 158) Worthington A, & Higgs H, Systematic 
Features of High-Frequency Volatility in Australian Electricity Markets: 
Intraday Patterns, Information Arrival and Calendar Effects, No 158, 
November 2003 
 
Worthington A, & Higgs H, Weak-form Market Efficiency in European 
Emerging and Developed Stock Markets, No 159, September 2003 
 
West T, & Worthington A, Macroeconomic Risk Factors in Australian 
Commercial Real Estate, Listed Property Trust and Property Sector 
Stock Returns: A Comparative Analysis using GARCH-M, No 160, 
October 2003 
 
Lee B, Interstate Comparison of Output and Productivity in the 
Australian Agricultural Sector – 1991 – 1999, No 161, October 2003 
 
McCarthy S, Hedging Versus not Hedging: Strategies for Managing 




Worthington A, Emergency Finance in Australian Households: 
An Empirical Analysis of Capacity and Sources, No 163, November 2003 
 
Worthington C, Debt as a Source of Financial Stress in Australian 
Households, No 164, November 2003  
 
Robinson M, The Australian Budgeting System: On the Cusp of Change, No 
165, November 2003 
 
Lahiri R, Cooperation v/s Non-cooperation in R&D Competition with 
Spillovers, No 166, December 2003 
 
Wolff R, Yao Q, & Tong H, Statistical Tests for Lyapunov Exponents of 
Deterministic Systems, No 167, December 2003 
 
Wolff R, Barnett A, A Time Domain Test for Some Types of Non-Linearity, 
No 168 December 2003 
 
 
LISTING OF DISCUSSION PAPERS - 2004 
 
Drew M, Veeraraghavan M, Ye M, Do Momentum Strategies Work? - 
Australian Evidence, No 169, January 2004 
 
Drew M, Mallin M, Naughton T, Veeraraghavan M, Equity Premium: - Does it 
Exist? – Evidence from Germany and United Kingdom, No 170, January 
2004 
 
Layton A, Valadkhani A, Measures of National Export Price Volatility Based 
on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, No 171, January 2004 
 
Drew M, Marsden A, Veeraraghavan M, Small Firm Effect, Liquidity and 
Security Returns: Australian Evidence, No 172, February 2004 
 
Drew M, Stanford J, Portability of Superannuation Balances, No 173, March 
2004 
 
Drew M, Naughton T, Veeraraghavan M Pricing of Equities in China: 
Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange No 174, May 2004 
 
Valadkhani A, Worthington A, Layton A, An Analysis of the Rising Cost of 
Education in Australia, No 175, April 2004  
Li S, Worthington A, The Relationship Between The Adoption of Internet 
Banking and Electronic Connectivity: - An International Comparison, No 
176, May 2004 
 
Drew M, Marsden A, Veeraraghavan M, Does Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Matter? – New Zealand Evidence, No 177, May 2004 
 
Guégan D, How Can We Dane the Concept of Long Memory? - An 
Econometric Survey, No 178, April 2004 
 
Clements A, Hurn S, White S, Discretised Non-Linear Filtering for 
Dynamic Latent Variable Models: with Application to Stochastic Volatility 
- No 179, May 2004 
 
McCarthy S, Ispriani A, An Operating/Economic Exposure Australian 
Case Study: Foster’s Group Limited, No 180, May 2004 
 
Lahiri R, On Skill Heterogeneity and Inflation, No 181, June 2004 
 
Bianchi R, Drew M, Polichronis J, A Test of Momentum Trading 
Strategies in Foreign Exchange Markets: Evidence from the G7, No 182, 
June 2004 
 
Jeisman S, Exchange Market Pressure in Australia, No 183, June 2004 
 
Higgs H, Worthington A, Financial Returns and Price Determinants in 
the Australian Art Market - 1973-2003, No 184, July 2004 
 
Worthington, A, The distribution of Financial Literacy in Australia, No 185, 
November 2004 
 
Higgs H, Worthington A, Systematic Features of High-Frequency 
Volatility in Australian Electricity Markets: Intraday Patterns, Information 
Arrival and Calendar Effects, No 186, December 2004 
 
 
LISTING OF DISCUSSION PAPERS - 2005 
 
Behrens P.  Economic Development Strategies: Examples from Europe 
and Australia, No 187, January 2005 
 
Wilson C, Tidsell C.  What Role Does Knowledge of Wildlife Play in 
Providing Support for Species’ Conservation?  No 188, February 2005 
 
Zhang S.  Consumption Behaviour Under Institutional Transitions in China, 
No 189, March 2005 
 
Collet J & Fadili J Simulation of Gegenbauer Processes Using Wavelet 
Packets - No 190, March 2005 
 
Clements A & White S.  Non-Linear Filtering With State Dependant 
Transition Probabilities:  A Threshold (Size Effect) SV Model.  No 191, April 
2005 
 
Clements A & White S.  Non-Linear Filtering For Stochastic Volatility Models 
with Heavy Tails and Leverage - No 192, April 2005 
 
Lee B.  Significance of Employing a Multilateral Index Formula for Interstate 
Comparisons: A Case Study of the Australian Farm Sector - No 193, June 
2005 
 
Li S, Alfay E.  Evidence on the Arbitrage Efficiency of SPI Index Futures and 
Options Markets – No 194, June 2005 
 
Worthington A, Lee B. Efficiency, Technology and Productivity Change in 
Australian Universities: 1998-2003 – No 195, June 2005 
 
Hoffman M, Worthington A, & Higgs H.  Modelling Residential Water 
Demand with Fixed Volumetric Charging in a Large Urban Municipality: The 
Case of Brisbane, Australia – No 196, June 2005 
 
Wilson, C.  Exposure to Pesticides, Ill-health and Averting Behaviour: Costs 
and Determining the Relationships – No 197, July 2005 
 
Wilson C & Tidsell C.  Globalisation, Concentration of Genetic Material and 
Their Implications for Sustainable Development – No 198, July 2005 
 
Pollard G.  The Cost Decision:  A New Discount Approach for Net Cost 
Projects – No 199, July 2005 
 
Layton A & Smith D. Testing of the Power of Leading Indicators into 
Predicting Business Cycle Phase Changes? – No 200, August 2005 
  
Worthington A C & Higgs H.  Market Risk in Demutualised Self-Listed 
Stock Exchanges: An International Analysis of Selected Time-Varying 
Betas – No 201, September 2005 
 
Handley-Schachler M & Li S.  International Effects of the Andersen 
Accounting and Auditing Scandals: Some Evidence from the US, UK 
and Australian Stock Markets – No 202, September 2005 
 
Lazarov Z.  Assessing the Economic Significance of the Intra-Daily 




















































































All correspondence to: 
 
Dr Steven Li 
Editor, Discussion Papers in Economic, Finance and 
International Competitiveness 
School of Economics and Finance 
Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434, BRISBANE QLD 4001, Australia 
 
Telephone:  61 7 3864 2521 
Facsimile:  61 7 3864 1500 







DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS, FINANCE 




Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Performance:  Some Evidence from Newly 







Discussion Paper No 204, November 2005 
 
 
Series edited by 
Dr Steven Li 
 
School of Economics and Finance 
 